Abstract-In this paper, we consider a multi-cell massive MIMO system with matched-filter precoding and artificial noise (AN) generation at the base station (BS) for secure downlink transmission in the presence of multi-antenna passive eavesdroppers. We derive two tight lower bounds for the achievable ergodic secrecy rate and a tight upper bound on the secrecy outage probability of the considered system. The analytical results are used to optimize the amount of power allocated for AN generation. Our results reveal that AN generation is not required in massive MIMO systems as long as the number of BS antennas is much larger than the number of eavesdropper antennas. However, as the number of eavesdropper antennas increases relative to the number of BS antennas, AN becomes beneficial and the amount of power optimally allocated to AN generation increases with the number of eavesdropper antennas.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a vital issue in wireless networks due to the broadcast nature of the medium. Traditionally, security has been achieved through cryptographic encryption implemented at the application layer. This approach is based on certain assumptions regarding computational complexity, and thereby potentially vulnerable [1] . As a complement to cryptographic techniques, physical layer security has drawn significant research and industrial interest recently. The pioneering work on physical layer security in [2] studied the classical threeterminal network consisting of a transmitter (Alice), an intended receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve). It was shown in [2] that a source-destination pair can exchange perfectly secure messages with a positive rate as long as the desired receiver enjoys better channel conditions than the eavesdropper(s). More recent studies have considered security issues in multi-antenna multiuser networks [3] . Although the secrecy capacity region for multiuser networks remains an open problem, it is interesting to investigate the achievable secrecy rates of such networks for certain practical transmission strategies. In particular, eavesdroppers are typically passive so as to hide their existence, and thus the channel state information (CSI) of Eves cannot be measured or obtained at Alice [4] . On the other hand, multiantenna techniques make it possible to simultaneously transmit artificial noise (AN) in addition to the information-bearing signals for secrecy enhancement [5] . Hence, AN generation is a common method to combat passive eavesdroppers in multipleinput multiple-output (MIMO) and multiuser MIMO wiretap channels. Specifically, AN is radiated isotropically to mask the information-bearing transmission to Bob. If perfect CSI of the channel between Alice and Bob is available at Alice, then the AN can be made invisible to Bob while degrading the decoding performance of possibly present Eves [4] - [9] .
Recently, an emerging cellular network architecture, known as massive or large-scale MIMO, has been proposed [10] , [11] , which equips base station (BS) antenna arrays with an order of magnitude more elements than what is used in current systems, i.e., a hundred antennas or more. The fundamental premise behind massive MIMO is to reap all the benefits of conventional multiuser MIMO (improving data rate, reliability, and reducing interference), but at a much larger scale. Thus, massive MIMO is considered as an enabling technology for future cellular wireless networks. Massive MIMO systems also provide promising prospectives for secure transmission as the large-scale antenna arrays offer a large number of spatial degrees of freedom.
In this paper, we study secure downlink transmission in massive MIMO systems in the presence of an eavesdropper which is equipped with multiple antennas. Unlike other work on physical layer security [1] - [9] , we consider a multi-cell setting and assume matched-filtering (MF) precoding for the desired users as is typical for massive MIMO systems. We note that MF precoding is usually preferred in massive MIMO systems, as the matrix inversions required for other techniques, such as zero-forcing (ZF) and minimum mean-square-error (MMSE) precoding, are computationally too expensive for large-scale systems [10] , [11] . We derive tight lower and upper bounds for the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability of massive MIMO systems employing AN generation, respectively. The derived bounds are in closed form and provide significant insight for system design and are exploited for derivation of a closed-form expression for the fraction of transmit power that should be optimally allocated to AN.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first introduce the system and channel models adopted in this paper, and then describe the proposed secure multi-cell massive MIMO downlink system.
A. System and Channel Models
In this paper, we consider a flat-fading multi-cell system consisting of M cells, as depicted in Fig. 1 . Each cell comprises an N t -antenna BS and K single-antenna mobile terminals (MTs). The n th cell, n ∈ {1, . . . , M}, is the local cell (the shaded area in Fig. 1 
B. Data Transmission and Artificial Noise Generation
In the local cell, the BS intends to transmit a confidential signal s nk to the k th MT. [7] . The AN vector, z n ∈ C (Nt−K)×1 , is multiplied by an AN shaping matrix
v.s with zero mean and unit variance. The columns of both W n and V n have unit norm. The signal vector transmitted by the local BS is given by
where p and q denote the transmit power allocated to each MT and each AN signal, respectively. For simplicity, we assume uniform power allocation across users and AN signals, respectively. Let the total transmit power be denoted by P . Then, p and q can be represented as p = φP K , and q = (1−φ)P Nt−K , respectively, where the power allocation factor φ, 0 < φ ≤ 1, strikes a power balance between the information-bearing signal and the AN. The optimal choice for φ will be investigated in Section III.B.
The M − 1 cells adjacent to the local cell transmit their own signals and AN. In this work, in order to be able to gain some fundamental insights, we assume that all cells employ identical values for p and q as well as φ. Accordingly, the received signals at the k th MT in the local cell and the eavesdropper are given by
respectively, where r eve ∈ C 1×Ne is the receive filter of the eavesdropper, n nk and n eve are the Gaussian noises at the k th MT and the eavesdropper with variance σ 2 nk and covariance σ 2 eve I Ne , respectively. As typical for massive MIMO systems, we adopt simple MF precoding, i.e., w nk = h H nk h nk [11] , [12] . Since the eavesdropper is assumed to be passive, its CSI is not available at the BS. Thus, the best choice for AN generation is to design the noise vectors such that they lie in the null space of the desired MT channels h nk , ∀k, such that no interference is caused to the MTs of the local cell as long as N t > K, i.e., h nk V n = 0, ∀k [4] - [7] .
Furthermore, we assume the eavesdropper can acquire knowledge of the effective channel that affects its desired signal, H eve m w nk , and thus, is able to perform maximum-ratio combining [8] , i.e., r eve =
C. Lower Bound on the Achievable Rate of Users
Since calculating the exact achievable rate of the users in the considered massive MIMO system is cumbersome, we follow [12] and derive an achievable lower bound. To this end, we rewrite the received signal at the k th MT in the local cell given in (2) as
where n nk represents the effective noise, which is given by
√ ph mk w ml s ml + n nk .
Applying Theorem 1 in [12] we obtain a computable lower bound for the achievable rate of the k th MT in the n th cell as R nk = log 2 (1+γ nk ), where γ nk represents the received signalto-noise-plus-interference ratio (SINR), given in (6) at the top of the next page, where var[
. Furthermore, the SINR at the eavesdropper is given by (7) at the top of the next page. We note that since the noise level at the eavesdropper is unavailable at the BS, we have assumed the worst case in (7), i.e., σ
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the considered downlink multi-cell massive MIMO system. To this end, we derive a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate (Section III.A), which can be further simplified and used for optimization of the power allocation factor φ (Section III.B), and an upper bound on the secrecy outage probability (Section III.C).
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate Analysis
The ergodic secrecy rate is an appropriate performance measure if delays can be afforded and coding over many independent channel realizations is possible. Considering the k th MT in the local cell, the considered channel is an instance of a multi-input, single-output, multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel [3] . Hence, the achievable secrecy rate of the k th MT in the local cell is bounded by the difference of the capacities of channel between the BS and the MT and between the BS and the eavesdropper. See [9, Lemma 2] for a proof. Thus, a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate of the k th MT in the local cell is given by
where [x] + = max{0, x} and C eve = E [log 2 (1 + γ eve )] denotes the ergodic capacity between the local BS and the eavesdropper seeking to decode the information of the k th MT in the local cell. Before we proceed to derive closed-form expressions for R nk and C eve , we define the ratio of the number of eavesdropper antennas and the number of BS antennas as α = N e /N t , and the ratio of the number of users and the number of BS antennas as β = K/N t . In the following, we consider the asymptotic regime where N t → ∞ with α and β being constant.
We first derive a simple expression for R nk . To this end, we first characterize some of the terms in (6) in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The received signal and interference powers at the k th MT in the local cell can be expressed as
respectively, where . Introducing x and y in (6) and dividing both numerator and denominator by p, we obtain (10) (shown at the top of the next page), where η = q/p.
According to [12] , for large N t , we have
N t = 1 and lim
Applying (11) in (10), we obtain
(12) In order to obtain simple yet insightful results, we adopt the simplified channel model from [13] and model the path-losses 
, (13) and the ergodic rate is lower bounded by R nk = log 2 (1 + γ nk ). We note that for systems with few users, i.e., β → 0, the lower bound on the ergodic rate reduces to
i.e., performance is limited by AN leakage from other cells. This is in contrast to massive MIMO systems without AN generation, whose performance in the considered regime (β → 0) is only limited by pilot contamination (which is not considered in this paper) [10] , [11] . Next, we analyze the eavesdropper's ergodic rate. Note that, unlike the user's ergodic rate, we cannot lower bound the eavesdropper's rate since otherwise we will not get a lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate. Thus, we derive an exact expression for the eavesdropper's ergodic rate. To this end, we first provide the cumulative density function (CDF) of the eavesdropper SINR (7) in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Assume the same simplified channel model as for the desired users is adopted, i.e., the path-loss between the eavesdropper and the BSs of other cells and the local BS are given by l eve m = ρ ∈ [0, 1], ∀m = n, and l eve n = 1, respectively. For this channel model, the CDF of the eavesdropper's SINR is given by (10) where
and
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. Based on Theorem 1, the exact expression for the ergodic rate of the eavesdropper is obtained as
where I(a, n) = ∞ 0 1 (x+1)(x+a) n dx. The desired lower bound on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate for the k th MT in the local cell is obtained by combing (8), (13) , and (18). We note that the exact ergodic secrecy rate could be obtained if we did not lower bound R nk but calculated the exact ergodic rate of the MT using a similar approach as for the eavesdropper. However, this would lead to a more complicated expression and the obtained lower bound is tight as will be confirmed in Section IV via simulations.
B. Optimal Power Allocation Factor φ *
Although the lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate derived in the previous subsection is easy to evaluate, it is not suitable for optimization. To arrive at a slightly less tight but much simpler lower bound, we first introduce a simple and tight upper bound on the eavesdropper's ergodic rate in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For N t → ∞, the eavesdropper's achievable rate can be upper bounded as C eve ≤C eve with
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. On the other hand, η can be expressed as
Combining (8), (13), (19) and (20), the proposed simple lower bound for the ergodic secrecy rate is obtained as
where we introduced the definitions a = (M − 1)ρ + 1/P and b = ρ(M −1)+1. Before we find the optimal φ, we consider the special case α → 0, i.e., the number of eavesdropper antennas is kept fixed while the number of BS antennas increases. In this case, we obtain from (21)
which is a strictly increasing function in φ. Thus, if the number of eavesdropper antennas does not grow with N t , φ * = 1 is optimal and zero power should be allocated to AN. Hence, large-scale MIMO systems are inherently secure and do not require AN generation as long as the number of eavesdropper antennas is much smaller than the number of BS antennas.
For general α, the lower bound in (21) has at most one maximum in the interval 0 < φ ≤ 1, which is given by
where
To gain more insight, we assume high transmit power, i.e., P 1, in which case b = a + 1 holds. Thus, φ * can be rewritten as
It can be observed from (24) that φ * is a monotonically decreasing function in α, i.e., the more antennas the eavesdropper has, the more power is allocated to combat eavesdropping via AN generation. Although less obvious, it can also be shown from (24) that for the relevant parameter range, i.e., a > 0, 0 < α ≤ 1, and 0 < β ≤ 1, φ * is a monotonically increasing function in β. This means that as the number of MTs in the cell increases, the amount of power allocated to AN generation decreases. This can be explained by the fact that as β increases, the transmit power per MT used for information transmission, φP/K, decreases. To compensate for this effect, a larger φ is necessary. This will further be verified in Section IV.
C. Secrecy Outage Probability Analysis
In delay limited scenarios, where one codeword spans only one channel realization, outages are unavoidable since Alice does not have the CSI of the eavesdropper channel and the secrecy outage probability has to be used to characterize the performance of the system instead of the ergodic rate. For the considered multi-cell massive MIMO system, the rate of the desired user, R nk , becomes deterministic as N t → ∞, but the instantaneous capacity of the eavesdropper channel remains a random variable. A secrecy outage occurs whenever the target secrecy rate R 0 exceeds the actual instantaneous secrecy rate. Thus, the secrecy outage probability of the k th MT in the local cell is given by
where F γ (x) is given in Theorem 1. We note that since R nk is in fact a lower bound on the user rate, ε out is actually an upper bound on the secrecy outage probability.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the considered multi-cell massive MIMO wiretap system. We consider a cellular system with M = 7 cells and the inter-cell interference factor is set to ρ = 0.3. All simulation results are averaged over 3, 000 random channel realizations. Note that in this paper, we consider the secrecy rate of a certain MT, i.e., the k th MT in the local cell. The cell sum secrecy rate can be obtained by multiplying the secrecy rate of the k th MT by the number of MTs, K, as for the considered channel model, all MTs in the local cell achieve identical secrecy rate.
In Fig. 2 , we show results for the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability of the k th MT in the local cell for a system with P = 10 dB, K = 10, α = 0.1, and φ = 0.75. We note that, for the considered system model, all users in the local cell achieve the same ergodic secrecy rate and the same (average) secrecy outage probability. In subfigure (a), lower bound I was obtained based on (8), (13) , and (18), lower bound II was obtained with (21), and the simulation results were obtained via Monte Carlo simulation of the exact secrecy rate expression. In sub-figure (b), the analytical result was obtained with (25) while Monte Carlo simulation was used to obtain the simulation results. Fig. 2 reveals that the derived analytical results for both the ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability are accurate. As expected, lower bound I is somewhat tighter than lower bound II. Also, increasing the number of BS antennas N t improves both the ergodic secrecy rate as well as the secrecy outage probability.
In Fig. 3 , we investigate the ergodic secrecy rate of the k a black circle in Fig. 3 and are in good agreement with the maximum of the simulated ergodic secrecy rate curves. As expected from our discussion in Section III.B, φ * increases with decreasing α and φ * = 1 is optimal for small α. Furthermore, Fig. 3 shows that for the considered system parameters, φ * is a monotonically increasing function of β, which is in the agreement with the observation at the end of Section III.B. Fig. 3 also reveals that the maximum achievable ergodic secrecy rate of a user decreases with increasing β and increasing α, since for increasing β, the resources (antennas, power) per user decrease 2 and for increasing α the eavesdropper becomes more powerful and more resources have to be dedicated to its degradation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a multi-cell massive MIMO system employing matched-filter precoding for the desired users and AN to degrade a multi-antenna passive eavesdropper. Two tight closed-form lower bounds for the ergodic secrecy rate and a tight closed-form upper bound for the secrecy outage probability were derived as functions of all relevant system parameters. Our results revealed that as long as the number of eavesdropper antennas is small compared to the number of BS antennas, AN is not required in massive MIMO systems as the highly selective beamforming enabled by the large matchedfilter precoder prevents eavesdropping. On the other hand, if the number of eavesdropper antennas is significant, AN is necessary and the power optimally allocated to AN generation increases with the number of eavesdropper antennas. Unlike conventional massive MIMO systems, whose performance is ultimately only limited by pilot contamination, the performance of secure massive MIMO systems is also limited by AN leakage from other cells.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Theorem 1
For notational conciseness, we express (7) as γ eve = X/Y , where X and Y denote the numerator and the denominator of (7), respectively, after dividing both parts by p. The combining vector at the eavesdropper, r eve =
, has unit norm, and thus, the interference term, Y , is statistically equivalent to a weighted sum of four (scaled) chi-square distributed r.v.s, 6 Y = ηy 1 + ηρy 2 + y 3 + ρy 4 , where (13)]. Therefore, it is convenient to first derive the Laplace transform of the probability density function (PDF) of Y . The PDF of y 1 is given by
and the Laplace form of 
Furthermore, the PDF of X is given by f X (x) = Γ(Ne) . Using similar arguments as for the independence of the y i , it can also be shown that X and Y are mutually independent. Thus, exploiting the derived expressions for f X (x) and f Y (x) and the definition of the CDF of γ eve , F γ (x) = Pr X Y ≤ x , we obtain (15) . This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Adopting the definition of X and Y from Appendix A and using Jensen's inequality, the following upper bound on the eavesdropper's achievable rate can be obtained
where the last equality is due to the independence of X and Y . Although the PDF of Y has been provided in Appendix A, to arrive at a simpler and more insightful result, we apply a useful approximation. Specifically, recalling a result given in [15] , Y can be approximated as a single scaled chi-square r.v., Y ≈ ξy ϕ , where y ϕ ∼ χ 
and 
From (31) and (32), it can be observed that ξ < 0.5. Thus, for N t → ∞, (30) simplifies to
where ξϕ is given by (31). Theorem 2 is obtained from (35) by exploiting the definitions of α and β. This completes the proof.
